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Abstract
Since the mid-1990s, the labor force participation of older men and women increased
substantially in France. In this paper, we investigate the causal impact of having a
participating wife on the labor market behavior of the elderly husband. Working with
data from the French Labour Force Survey and using the cohort-specific participation
rate of women at age 40 as an instrument for their current participation, we find that the
magnitude of the causal relationship is strong. The likelihood of husbands’ participation
increases of about 28 points when their wives are currently active on the labor market.
Such findings support the view that some complementarities in leisure exist so that
French married men attribute a higher value to leisure when it is shared with their
wife. It also suggests that policy makers should take into account both direct and
indirect effects when they implement a change in the economic environment of elderly.
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1 Introduction
In many OECD countries, we observe that the labor market attachment, measured by the
participation rate or the employment rate, of men aged 50-64 substantially increased since
at least the mid-1990s. However, such an increase in labor market attachment was preceded
by an important downward trend throughout the post WWII. In the meantime, the labor
supply of women of the same age group followed a clear upward trend and increased sharply.
The latter increase is one of the reflections of important structural changes that occurred
during this period: access to the birth control pill (Bailey, 2006), a general increase of wives’
bargaining power within the household, and so on. Figure 1 illustrates this evolution for
the French economy, the country under scrutiny in this paper. In France, the labor force
participation rate (LFPR, thereafter) of older men fell from 68% to less than 60% over the
1983-1995 periods while the one for older women increased of about 6 point over the same
period. After the mid-1990s, the LFPR of French older men (re-)increased to reach 67% in
2016.1 At the end of the sample period studied here, the gap between LFPR of French older
men and women was approximately equal to 5 points, whereas it was of about 25 points in
19832. Overall, from these figures it seems that there is a positive association between the
participation of women and men, and it is reasonable to imagine that this link is stronger
within couples. The main objective of the present paper is to estimate to what extent the
labor supply of wives causally impacts the labor supply of their husbands in France.
The causes and consequences of these shifts in labor market attachment of elderly have
attracted the attention of policy makers and researchers alike, particularly in light of recent
reforms that affect pension schemes or the minimum age at retirement. It is crucial to under-
stand the reason explaining labor supply decisions of older individuals. For instance, if the
recent increase in older men’s activity is not related to the labor supply of their wives, but
rather a consequence of other factors, such as educational attainment, then policies aiming at
changing the path of labor market activity at the end of the active life have any externalities
on the partner. By contrast, if husband’s participation is, at least in part, causally driven by
his wife own participation, then policy makers should design their toolkit on the modeling of
the joint labor market participation decision within couples. In such a context, the decision
to work or not is interdependent and any reforms changing the economic environment at the
end of the active life could potentially affect both partners.
The current economic literature presents some piece of evidence indicating that married
1Strictly speaking, the LFPR of older men falls between 2002 and 2007 before increasing again. The
sensitivity analysis conducted in this paper indicates that such a break is not a matter of concern for the
question under investigation in this paper.
2The same pattern could be observed for the employment rate. In 1983, the gender gap was approximately
equal to 28 points. It fell to 5 points in 2016.
2
couples are likely to coordinate their retirements (Hurd (1990), Gustman and Steinmeier
(2000)). More specifically, in the US context it is shown that a husband responds more to
the retirement of his wife than she does. In this paper, we do not focus on retirement per se
but rather on the joint labor supply decisions that occurs just before the end of the active
life. In this respect, Schirle (2008) shows that having an active wife increases significantly the
likelihood of participation of her older husband, in the US, Canada and the UK. Focusing on
younger people, Hamermesh (2000) show that couples change their working day schedule in
order to enjoy leisure together. Overall, two economic interpretations are invoked to explain
how wives’ participation influences husband labor market attachment. The first channel is
an income effect implying that, all else being equal, having a participating wife increases
non-labor income of her husband. This extra-revenue is able to act as a preference shifter,
decreasing the marginal utility of consumption leading ultimately to an increase in leisure
and so non-participation. The second channel is a shared leisure effect operating if they
are some complementarities so that couple members have a preference to spend their leisure
time together. In this context, a husband does not evaluate as much its leisure time if it is
spent alone. Therefore, having a participating spouse decreases the marginal utility of leisure
(and so non-participation) leading ultimately to an increase in older men labor supply. The
empirical model developed in this paper will allow us to conclude about which of the two
effects prevails over the other one.
The concrete measure of the relationship between spouses’ labor supply is however not
straightforward. Although prima facie a positive correlation between husbands and wives
participation is observed (e.g. figure 1), it remains quite hard to disentangle a causal rela-
tionship for at least two reasons. First, the two decisions are influenced by common factors
so that it is necessary to control for observable characteristics in the empirical model. Second
and perhaps most importantly, the labor market behaviors of husbands and wives are likely
to be simultaneous. As a consequence of these shortcomings, standard models as Ordinary
Least Square (OLS, thereafter) or Probit are biased when the wife’s labor market status ap-
pears as an explanatory variable in husband’s equation. In order to identify a causal effect,
an exogenous source of variation of wives’ participation is needed. In this respect, we follow
Schirle (2008) by using a measure of cohort-specific participation rate of women at age 40 as
instrument, a cohort being defined as women’s year of birth. This instrument should capture
the general increase in female participation implying that women belonging to recent cohort
are much more likely to participate than those belonging to older cohort. Thus, we expect
that the cohort LFPR of women at age 40 to be strongly related to wives’ current labor
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market status.3 Given the choice of the instrument, different econometric models could be
used to estimate the marginal effect of interest. Here, we employ a Two-Stage Least Squares
strategy but also a Bivariate Probit model. In doing so, we test for the robustness of the
empirical finding.
We make use of the two available versions of the French Labour Force Survey (FLFS,
thereafter) in our investigation. The first is the quarterly version of the FLFS that exists
since 2003. This database has several practical advantages for the problem in hand: it is
representative of the French population, it contains a large number of observations allowing
us to be immune from sampling errors when focusing on elderly and it provides information
about individuals’ characteristics but also about members within the same household. The
quarterly FLFS covers the 2003-2016 period and is used to construct the sample on which
the econometric model will be estimated. The second database employed is the previous
annual version of the FLFS that exists since 1983. This source is particularly suitable for
the construction of the cohort-specific participation rate of women at age 40.4 Finally, the
availability of the data implies that the sample of interest contains married men aged be-
tween 50-64 years old with a wife born between 1943 (the first cohort available from the 1983
version of the FLFS) and 1976 (the last cohort available from the 2016 version of the FLFS).
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. The first stage estimation confirms that
our instrument has a significant impact on wives’ current participation. Specifically, a 1 point
increase in the cohort-specific participation rate at 40 induces an increase in women likeli-
hood of participation of about 2.5 points. Moreover, some clues suggest the appropriateness
of the instrumentation strategy leading us to be confident about the interpretation of the
second stage equation. OLS regressions of the husbands’ equation confirm a positive corre-
lation between wives’ labor market status and husbands’ participation. However, the size of
the impact changes when the former is instrumented. In particular, it is shown that OLS
(or Probit) estimated coefficients are biased downward. Overall, our favorite specification
indicates that having a participating wife leads to an increase in husband’s participation of
28 points when Two-Stage Least Squares are used. These findings confirm that the shared
leisure effect is stronger than any income effects suggesting that French older married men
are quite sensitive to the current labor market behavior of their wives. Our conclusions con-
stitute another piece of evidence for policy makers indicating that any modifications of the
economic environment of elderly could have important effects not only on the single individ-
3It should be observed that we focus on the effect of wives’ participation on the labor market behaviors
of their husbands. Given that we do not have any instruments affecting exogenously male labor market
status, the reversed effect, namely the causal effect of husbands’ activity on their wives behaviors, can not
be investigated.
4Strictly speaking, the quarterly FLFS is also employed to construct measure of cohort participation
between 2003 and 2016.
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Figure 1: Labor force participation and employment rate of men and women aged 50-64 y.o.
- France.
Sources: French Labour Force Survey (1983-2016), author’s own calculations.
ual but also on the joint participation decision within households.
The paper proceeds in 6 sections including the introduction. In section 2, we provide a
brief overview of the literature and we present in more depth the data. Section 3 presents
both the theoretical and the empirical framework. The 4th section presents the main result
of the paper. In section 5, an array of robustness check is conducted. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Literature background
An important US literature suggests that couple members coordinate their retirement deci-
sions so that both the husband and its wife retire close in time, often during the same year
(Hurd, 1990). Some evidence of joint retirement has been put in evidence by Blau (1998).
Using the Retirement History Survey, he finds strong associations between the participation
probabilities of one spouse and the labor force status of the other spouse. In particular,
living with a non-participant partner increases the likelihood of retirement of the other cou-
ple member. From a different data source, the Health and Retirement Study, Gustman and
Steinmeier (2000) find that the retirement probability of husbands is substantially affected
by the retirement status of their wives. However, they find no significant effect in the op-
posite direction suggesting that wives do not confer the same value to the retirement status
of their partners than husbands do. In order to explain why couple members adjust their
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retirement strategies, the shared leisure effect is often put in evidence. In this respect, Blau
(1998) affirms that to understand the incidence of joint retirements, it is necessary to go
beyond the analysis of financial incentives. The existing literature provides strong evidence
suggesting that the root of the shared leisure hypothesis is the notion of complementarity
between wives and husbands leisure time. In this respect, Maestas (2001) reports that 62% of
older men look forward to retiring only if their wives are able to retire as well. Studying the
labor market behavior of older men, Schirle (2008) indicates that having a participating wife
pushes the likelihood of older husband’s participation up of about 20 points. An interesting
point about her results is that the magnitude of the effect is very similar for countries such
as the US, the UK and Canada.
By contrast to the US, the French case is relatively less documented. To the best of our
knowledge, the first study working with French data is the one of Se´dillot and Walraet (2002).
They show that French couples are also likely to take joint retirement decisions. However,
and by contrast to the US case, they find that French women’s retirement behaviors are more
affected by the labor market status of their husbands. In a recent contribution, Stancanelli
(2017) estimates the direct and indirect effects of a reform of the French pension on the
retirement probability of both spouses.5 From a regression discontinuity design, she finds
that the husband’s probability falls of about 1 point if his wife is affected by the reform,
while she does not respond if her husband is affected, at least in the short run. In France,
the implementation of the survey “Retirement motivation” in 2008 allows us to have further
clues about the strength of the interactions between the retirement behaviors within cou-
ples. More specifically, 18% of retired elderly interviewed claim that having a retired partner
was important for their own retirement decision. As for the US, the shared leisure hypoth-
esis is viewed as a potential determinant of the willingness to retire together. Stancanelli
and Van Soest (2016) exploit diary data to investigate to what extent partners spend more
leisure time together upon retirement. They find that wife’s retirement increases significantly
couple’s joint leisure time. Their findings reinforce the idea that leisure complementarities
are significant, at least in France. Our study complements the existing French evidence by
examining to what extent the labor supply of wives significantly affects the labor supply of
their husband, just before the effective age of retirement.
2.2 Data
We exploit the two available versions of the French Labour Force Survey (FLFS): the quar-
terly version over the 2003-2016 period and the annual version over the 1983-2002 period.
5Depending on the year of birth, the reforms requires that people need to work more months to retire
with maximum pension benefit.
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The quarterly FLFS Since 2003, the FLFS is a quarterly survey of about 100 000 ob-
servations, which is conducted by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic
Studies. Before 2003, the survey was annual. The survey’s sample is a rotating panel divided
into 6 subgroups (or wave). Each quarter, 1/6 of a sample is renewed: a new wave enters
while the oldest wave leaves the sample. In this research, we only work with the entering
wave of each quarterly sample. This choice can be justified by the fact that considering each
quarterly sample entirely could induce repeated observations of the same individuals. The
FLFS has several advantages compared to others databases. The first advantage relies on
its representativeness of the French population and the very large number of individuals in
the sample. This means that the FLFS is particularly suitable to eliminate most of sampling
errors when one computes statistics on a particular subgroup, as it is done here with older
married men. The second advantage is the wealth of information about people’s demograph-
ics, labor market state or education. In particular, as the sample unit is the household, we
are able to recover information about the household head (generally the man or the husband)
but also all other members of the household (his wife, his children and so on). Thus, for each
man living with a partner (or loosely speaking the husband),we know if his partner (or loosely
speaking his wife) is in or out of the labor force. Another potential advantage of the FLFS is
that it addresses some issues related to the measurement of the labor market states. Indeed,
as definitions of the International Labour Office (ILO) are used, individuals participating to
the labor market are those employed or unemployed, namely those that are actively searching
for a job and available to take a job in a short delay (2 weeks). This distinction between
unemployed and inactive people is not trivial since other databases, e.g. the French Census,
use declarative measures that are more likely to be concerned by mismeasurement issues.
The annual FLFS As the instrumental variable used in the empirical application is a
cohort measure of female’s LFPR at age 40, in addition to the quarterly FLFS, we make use
of the annual version of the FLFS available for the 1983-2002 period. We define a cohort
in a restrictive way: a woman’s cohort is defined according to her exact year of birth. In a
robustness check, we will test the sensitivity of our results to a broader definition of cohorts.
Given the availability of the data, we drop observations for which the computation of cohort-
specific participation rate at 40 is not possible. Indeed, the first available cohort-specific
LFPR is from the 1983 version of the annual FLFS and corresponds to women born in 1943.
The last cohorts is from the 2016 version of the FLFS and corresponds to women born in
1976. Finally, our main sample of interest contains married men aged 50-64 years old, over
the 2003-2016 period, with a partner born between 1943 and 1976.
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2.3 Some stylized facts
Figure 1 shows that two distinct periods are observable over the post-2000s, especially for
older men participation rate. In the first part of this subsample, until 2007, the LFPR of
older men decreased of about 5 points. Then, a trend break is perceptible in 2008 and the
LFPR (re-)increased to reach 67% in 2016. By contrast, for older women the trend is upward
but accelerated from 2008. One could argue that such movements in older men participation
rate could be a concern for our econometric models because they may reflect some cyclical
feature of the French economy. To address this issue, we add annual fixed effects as control
variables to capture some cyclical features of the data. Moreover, in a step of robustness the
model is estimated by considering only the post-2008 period.
Table 1 reports a set of summary statistics about married older men of our sample. We
could observe that the participation rate of French married men increases slightly between
2003 and 2016. However, this general picture hides some heterogeneity. Indeed, during this
period, we witness an increase of about 3 percentage points in the LFPR of married men
with a participating wife. By contrast, the LFPR of married men with a wife out of the
labor force fall of about 4 points. Overall, in 2016 there is a difference in participation of
about 30 points between older men with an active wife and older men with an inactive wife.
This suggests that participation behaviors of husbands and wives are positively correlated.
Focusing now only on the husband’s wives, it is shown that their participation rate increase
of 3 points between 2003 and 2016.
Table 1 also describes married men according to some demographics that enters as control
variables in our empirical model. It is of interest to observe that the average age of married
men belonging to our sample increases of 1.5 years old between 2003 and 2016. The age vari-
able appears as an important control because we could expect that it plays an important role
in participation/retirement behaviors. An increase in age could shift individuals’ preference
for leisure by, for example, decreasing the marginal utility of consumption and increasing the
marginal utility of leisure. Furthermore, Hairault, Langot, and Sopraseuth (2010) show that
the likelihood of participation is significantly affected by the distance to retirement. Specifi-
cally, on a frictional labor market, the returns to job of older workers depends on its expected
duration. The shorter the time to retirement is, the lower the probability of getting a new
job when unemployed is. In this application, we consider the age variable as a “catchall”
of this effect. The average age of women also increases. However, the speed of the rise is
higher for wives than what it is for their husband. This suggests that the average age gap
within couple decreases markedly during the sample period. In the context of this paper, it
should be observed that the age gap within couples could capture some income effects due to
the fact that, all else being equal, a younger wife is more likely to participate but also more
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Married men Wife in LFP Wife not in LFP
2003 2016 2003 2016 2003 2016
Activity 0.68 0.69 0.76 0.79 0.53 0.49
Wife’s activity 0.64 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Age 55.4 56.9 54.7 56.0 56.6 58.8
Wife’s age 51.6 54.3 50.8 52.7 53.1 57.7
Children in household 0.46 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.42 0.32
Nb. children 0.81 0.74 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.57
No degree 0.36 0.23 0.34 0.20 0.39 0.30
< High school 0.37 0.43 0.39 0.44 0.35 0.40
High school 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.11
High school +2 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.07
> High school +2 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.12
Table 1: Summary statistics of older married men (50-64 y.o.)
Sources : French Labour Force Survey (2003-2016), author’s own calculations.
able to support the retirement decision of her husband. Finally, whatever the participation
of the wife, we observe a substantial increase in educational attainment of older married
men. For example, the share of men without any degree falls of 13 points while the share of
those having a high school degree increases of 2 points between 2003 and 2016. As a result,
controlling for such structural trends is of particular importance because the likelihood of
participation increases with the education level.
3 The framework
3.1 Theoretical elements
The empirical model of this paper can find its rational with a simple static framework in which
both the husband and his wife maximize their own utility independently and consider some
proportion of the partner’s income as non-labor income. It should be observed that some
more sophisticated framework could be employed. However, relying on such a simple model
allows us to link its theoretical prescription with its data-driven reduced-form counterpart.
Let husband’s labor supply behavior be driven by the following latent variable Y H∗, where
Y H∗it = U
H(Cit, Y
H
it , X
H
it , Y
W
it |Y Hit = 1)− UH(Cit, Y Hit , XHit , Y Wit |Y Hit = 0) (1)
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The first term of the right hand side of this equation is the utility obtained when the individual
participates to the labor market (Y Hit = 1) whereas the second term represents the utility
obtained when the individual does not supply his labor (Y Hit = 0). These two utility gains
depend on individual’s consumption of goods Cit, individual’s participation Y
H
it , his own
characteristics XHit such as demographics or educational attainment, and the labor supply of
his partner Y Wit . In this context, a husband will supply his labor when the utility obtained
when participating on the labor market is higher than the utility obtained when being outside
of the labor market. In other words, an husband participates when Y H∗it > 0. From this
simple decision rule, wife’s participation could change husband’s own participation by two
main channels. First, there is an income effect suggesting that a husband is less likely to
participate if his wife supplies her labor. Indeed, as wife’s participation acts as a preference
shifters and increases to some extent the household’s income available for consumption, all
else being equal, the husband will be likely to enjoy more leisure. The income effect is always
negative. Second, there is a substitution effect that requires two conditions for being effective.
On the one hand, couples should make interdependent leisure decisions. On the other hand, it
should exist some complementarity in leisure time. Put differently, this condition states that
both the husband and the wife should prefer spending part of their leisure time together. As
demonstrated by Stancanelli and Van Soest (2016), this statement is empirically supported,
at least on French data. More specifically, they show that wife’s retirement, a close cousin of
the notion of non-participation used in this paper, significantly increases couple’s joint leisure
time. Under these two conditions, the substitution effect implies that wife’s participation
pushes the marginal utility of husband’s leisure time down leading ultimately to an increase
in his labor supply. In contrast to the income effect, the substitution effect is expected to be
positive.
3.2 Empirical model
Moving now to the data, the empirical model to be estimated can be written in linear terms
as:
Y Hit = γ
HY Wit +Xitβ
H + εHit (2)
Y Wit = Xitβ
W + δWZWit + ε
W
it (3)
with, Xit a vector of covariates such as husband’s age, the age gap between the husband and
his wife, dummies for husband’s education level,6 the number of children at home, annual
fixed effects and dummies indicating the region of residence. β is a vector of coefficients
associated to covariates while εit are standard error terms. The coefficient of main interest
6In a more complete model, dummies for wife’s education level will be added.
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is the one associated to wife’s participation γH . It is a reflection of which of the two effects
mentioned previously, namely the substitution effect and the income effect, prevails over the
other one. If the sum of these two effects is negative (γH < 0), then the income effect is
stronger than the substitution effect and wife’s activity decreases husband’s participation.
By contrast, if the sum of these two effects is positive (γH > 0), then the substitution effect
prevails over the income effect, and wife’s activity is likely to increase husband own activity.
The estimated coefficient associated to wife’s participation in equation (2) (γH) is proba-
bly endogenous because labor supply decisions within the couple is likely to be simultaneous.
As a result, we estimate this system of two equations by the Instrumental Variable (IV)
method and Bivariate Probit, the used instrument being ZWit . In order to be transparent,
we use both strategies to estimate the marginal effect of interest. However, our favorite
specification is the IV method. The IV estimator, which uses a Two-Stage Least Squares
strategy, has several practical advantages for the problem in hand. In contrast to maximum
likelihood models, it does not specify the distribution of error terms. It is relatively simple
to implement and, as argued by Angrist and Pischke (2009), when it comes to approximate
marginal effects it works well. Then, this model does not specify any types of distribution
for the endogenous variables. They may be censored, discrete or continuous (Lewbel, Dong,
and Thomas, 2012).
In the context of the IV model, two general assumptions are required for having valid
instrument. First, it should have a significant predictive power on the endogenous variable.
This assumption implies that the correlation between Zit and wife’s participation should be
different from 0 so that a difference in labor supply likelihood can be measured. Estimates of
the first stage provide information about the validity of this assumption. The second assump-
tion states that Zit should not be correlated with the error terms of equation (2) (exclusion
restriction). Put differently, Zit must be itself exogenous and its effect on husband’s labor
supply acts only indirectly through its (direct) effect on wife’s participation.
Along the lines of Schirle (2008), Zit corresponds to a measure of cohort-specific partici-
pation rates of the wife at age 40, a cohort being defined by the wife’s year of birth. Given
the general increase in female’s participation over the second half of the XXth century, it
is expected that women belonging to cohort with high level of participation at age 40 are
more likely to be “currently” active. In regards to our sample of married women, we could
observe that those belonging to the very first cohorts did not have a full control of their
motherhood. Until 1967 the access to the birth pill control were not free and abortion has
been legalized (only) in 1975 with the “Veil law”. By contrast, women of younger cohorts
had free access to the “pill” and abortion so that they were more able to control when and
how much children they want. Such changes across cohorts are probably useful for predicting
11
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
70
75
80
85
Figure 2: Labor force participation rate at 40 of women born between 1943 and 1976. -
France.
Sources: French Labour Force Survey (1983-2016), author’s own calculations.
the likelihood of current participation. In a seminal contribution Bailey (2006) finds that
the liberalization of contraceptive has a causal impact on female’s labor market outcomes
and especially their participation rate. Figure 2 shows the evolution of participation rates at
40 for women born between 1943 and 1976. Clearly, the likelihood of participating follows
an upward trend suggesting that women born in the latter cohorts were more often active
in the labor market at 40 than those born in the first cohorts. However, around the clear
upward trend, we observe some “noisy” movements that could be a consequence of sample
fluctuations. In section 5, we construct another measure of cohort-specific LFPR and we
test the robustness of our results to this new instrument. Unfortunately, we do not have in
hand any valid instruments to study the reversed effect, namely how husband’s participation
impacts wife’s participation. Indeed, the same measure of cohort-specific participation rate
for men does not display any trend and do not have any impact on his current likelihood of
participating.
4 Results
When presenting the results, we follow the traditional approach which consists first in a
description of the first stage equation, namely the wife’s equation, and then we show results
relative to the estimated equation of main interest.
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4.1 The wife’s equation
Results of the estimated equation linking wife’s labor supply to covariates and the instrument
Zit are reported in table 2. Several features of this table merits attention. It is shown
that the cohort-specific participation rate induces a significant increase in female’s current
participation. On average, a 1 point increase in the cohort participation rate at age 40
pushes women likelihood of participation up of about 2.6 points. The estimated marginal
effect is precise, significant and of the same order in both specifications. Moreover, including
female’s education level in the vector of control variables does not change the magnitude of
the estimated effect. Even if there are no direct test for the validity of the instrumentation
strategy, some clues suggest its appropriateness. First, F-statistics of first stage equations
are largely above the threshold of 10 suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005).7 This indicates
that the instrument is non-weak. Second, as a further check for the validity of the exclusion
restriction, we adopt a similar strategy than Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004). More
specifically, to test whether the wife’s cohort participation rate at age 40 has an impact
on current husband’s labor supply, we estimate both a Probit model and an OLS model of
equation (2) but we add Zit as an additional covariate. A violation of the exclusion restriction
will be suspicious in the event that, even after controlling for our set of covariates, Zit has
a significant impact on older participation. In this case, a significant relationship reveals a
direct channel which is beyond the impact of the instrument on wife’s activity. Estimation
results unveil that the estimated coefficient associated to the cohort-specific participation
rate is 0.8
As regard to covariates, our estimates indicate that all of them have the expected sign.
On average, the husband’s age decreases wife’s likelihood of participating. Combined with
the fact that the estimated coefficient associated to the age differential within couples is
significantly positive, this could be a piece of evidence in favor of a shared leisure effect. Living
in an area other than Paris and having children at home decrease female’s participation.
Finally, it should be observed that the effect of husband’s education level is significant only
for the dummy indicating that he has no degree. As expected, wife’s educational attainment
is an important determinant of her participation to the labor force.
7In particular, they are equal to 763 and 696 in each IV specification.
8Detailed results are available upon request.
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OLS
Probit
OLS
Probit
Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff.
Cohort activity at 40
0.026 *** 0.074 *** 0.023 *** 0.026 *** 0.075 *** 0.023 ***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Husband’s age
-0.030 *** -0.092 *** -0.029 *** -0.029 *** -0.090 *** -0.028 ***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age gap
0.014 *** 0.046 *** 0.014 *** 0.013 *** 0.045 *** 0.014 ***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Nb. of children
-0.048 *** -0.154 *** -0.049 *** -0.048 *** -0.155 *** -0.048 ***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Urban
-0.058 *** -0.185 *** -0.058 *** -0.056 *** -0.177 *** -0.055 ***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005)
Paris (ref.) – – – – – –
Rural
-0.029 *** -0.089 *** -0.028 *** -0.027 *** -0.080 *** -0.025 ***
(0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006)
Husbdand’s education level
No degree
-0.077 *** -0.245 *** -0.077 *** -0.042 *** -0.131 *** -0.041 ***
(0.005) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.006)
< High school
-0.006 -0.021 -0.006 -0.007 -0.027 -0.009
(0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005)
High school (ref.) – – – – – –
High school +2 years
0.014 *** 0.045 *** 0.014 *** -0.005 -0.019 -0.006
(0.007) (0.024) (0.008) (0.007) (0.025) (0.007)
> High school +2 years
0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.049 *** -0.178 -0.056
(0.006) (0.021) (0.001) (0.006) (0.022) (0.007)
Wife’s education level
No degree – – –
-0.035 *** -0.108 *** -0.034 ***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
< High school – – –
0.066 *** 0.201 *** 0.063 ***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
High school (ref.) – – – – – –
High school +2 years – – –
0.093 *** -0.318 *** 0.099 ***
(0.006) (0.019) (0.004)
> High school +2 years – – –
0.156 *** 0.548 *** 0.171 ***
(0.007) (0.022) (0.007)
Table 2: Wife’s equation - “first stage” estimation.
Sources: French Labour Force Survey (2003-2016), author’s own calculations
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significant levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Samples contain wifes of married
men aged between 50 and 64 years old. Marginal effects are mean marginal effects. Annual fixed effects are integrated in each
regressions but they are not reported in the table.
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4.2 The husband’s equation
The second stage estimation results linking participation of older married men with wives’
participation and control variables are displayed in table 3. Due to space limitations, we
do not report results using the Probit specification.9 The two OLS columns of the table
consistently show a positive association between wife and husband own participation. In the
other column, we use Zit as an instrument for female’s participation. Such a strategy leads
to a larger effect suggesting that OLS models are biased downward. This finding is quite
surprising. Indeed, because of the assortative matching in the marriage market hypothesis,
one could argue that individuals with similar preferences are more likely to match, leading
ultimately to an upward bias in OLS estimates. To note, Schirle (2008) finds that estima-
tion results obtained without using the instrument are biased upward in the UK while any
significant differences between specifications are observed in Canada and the US. Overall,
in France, the estimated marginal effect of having a participating wife on husband’s partic-
ipation ranges between 22 and 28 points depending on the specification used. Again, the
estimated effect is precise, significant and adding wife’s education level as covariates does
not change the magnitude of the marginal effect. Unambiguously, our estimates suggest that
the shared leisure effect dominates over any income effects. This finding is in line with Stan-
canelli and Van Soest (2016) who finds, using French data, that spouses coordinate their
retirement. Our findings could be seen as a refinement of their conclusion. Indeed, we show
that interactions exist not only at the retirement stage but also at the end of the active life,
just before the retirement.
9However, they remain available upon request.
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OLS IV
Biprobit
OLS IV
Biprobit
Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff.
Wife’s activity
0.115 *** 0.280 *** 0.968 *** 0.223 *** 0.114 *** 0.282 *** 0.960 *** 0.221 ***
(0.003) (0.032) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.069) (0.019)
Husband’s age
-0.062 *** -0.054 *** -0.190 *** -0.044 *** -0.062 *** -0.054 *** -0.191 *** -0.044 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Age gap
0.000 *** -0.004 *** -0.017 *** -0.004 *** 0.000 *** -0.005 *** 0.018 *** -0.004 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Nb. of children
0.010 *** 0.018 *** 0.102 *** 0.023 *** 0.010 *** 0.018 *** 0.100 *** 0.023 ***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001)
Urban
-0.046 *** -0.037 *** -0.155 *** -0.036 *** -0.045 *** -0.036 *** -0.151 *** -0.035 ***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020) (0.004)
Paris (ref.) – – – – – –
Rural
-0.039 *** -0.035 *** -0.159 *** -0.031 *** -0.038 *** -0.033 *** 0130 *** 0.030 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005)
Husbdand’s education level
No degree
-0.104 *** -0.092 *** -0.367 *** -0.084 *** -0.099 *** -0.092 *** -0.365 *** -0.084 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.005)
< HS
-0.061 *** -0.060 *** -0.244 *** -0.050 *** -0.057 *** -0.059 *** -0.235 *** -0.054 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004)
HS (ref.) – – – – – – – –
HS +2 years
0.022 *** 0.019 *** 0.108 *** 0.025 0.018 0.019 0.101 *** 0.023 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.006)
> HS +2 years
0.124 *** 0.124 *** 0.581 *** 0.134 *** 0.114 *** 0.122 *** 0.555 *** 0.128 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.026) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.026) (0.006)
Wife’s education level
No degree – – – –
-0.008 ** -0.002 -0.006 *** -0.001 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003)
< HS (ref.) – – – –
-0.004 -0.016 *** -0.056 *** -0.013 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.001)
HS – – – – – – – –
HS +2 years – – – –
0.010 ** -0.005 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.023) (0.005)
> HS +2 years – – – –
0.022 *** -0.004 0.055 * 0.013 *
(0.006) (0.007) (0.028) (0.007)
Table 3: Husband’s equation - “second stage” estimation.
Sources: French Labour Force Survey (2003-2016), author’s own calculations.
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significant levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Samples contain married men aged between
50 and 64 years old. Marginal effects are mean marginal effects. Annual fixed effects are integrated in each regressions but they are not
reported in the table.
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Results of table 3 also show that control variables also have a significant impact on the
labor supply decisions of older married men. In particular, increasing the age of 1-year leads
to a fall in man’s activity of about 3 percentage points. This finding confirms that the age
shifts individuals’ preference in favor of leisure leading ultimately to an increase in the retire-
ment probability. In contrast to their wife, the age gap between spouses has any incidence
on husband’s participation since the estimated coefficients are 0 in nearly all specifications.
If the number of children at home decreases wife’s participation, the opposite is observed for
the husband. Educational attainment is another important factor in understanding partic-
ipation behavior. In particular, older men with the highest education level, probably those
with the highest opportunity cost of staying at home, are more likely to supply their labor.
Finally, our model estimates suggest that wife’s education level does not have strong effects
on husband’s participation decision. Indeed, estimated coefficients associated to dummies for
wife’s education are in general non-significant and when they are significant, the marginal
effect is estimated to be low (see the last 3 columns of table 3).
5 Sensitivity analysis
Overall, estimates reported in table 3 indicate that the shared leisure effect dominate so that
when his wife participate to the labor marker the husband is also more likely to participate.
However, these findings could be sensitive to different modeling choices. In this subsection,
we apply a battery of robustness checks to confirm the phenomena unveiled previously. Table
4 reports the results of our alternative estimations. It should be observed that to save some
space, we report only the estimated coefficients associated to wife’s participation.10
Employment as dependent variable In our baseline specification, the variable of main
interest is the labor supply of the husband and the latter is explained, among others, by his
wife’s activity instrumented by her cohort LFPR at age 40. Although, this choice appears
to be quite natural, it could be interesting to focus on another indicator of labor market
attachment: the employment status. Indeed, as only a fraction of the participating wives are
employed, we could imagine that for their husbands the shared leisure effect, the dominant
effect in the baseline model, has more chances to be effective. In the current exercise, we
replace labor market participation by employment. Corresponding estimates for the second
stage are reported in row 2 of table 4.
10Complete tables are available upon request.
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Shared leisure and husband’s age Another important robustness check is to establish if
the results are of the same order with different age groups. In particular, as our baseline model
suggests that the shared leisure effect is strong for married men aged between 50-64 years old,
we could expect that the latter changes for younger men. For instance, we could imagine that
preferences evolve with the age so that younger married men confer relatively less importance
to the shared leisure value. Moreover, the income effect due to wife’s participation could be
more important for younger married men because on average their wives have more chances
to be active. To address this potential issue, we run regressions by considering married men
aged between 25-49 years old. Results from these new estimations are reported in row 2 of
table 4.
Changing the cohort-specific LFPR In the baseline specification, we use as instrument
the cohort participation rate at 40, a cohort being “strictly” defined by the exact women year
of birth. As shown in figure 2, such a measure is a bit “noisy” and we are able to observe some
weird variations around the clear upward trend. A potential explanation for such movements
could be the relatively small number of observations belonging to each cohort. On average,
there are 1045 available observations to compute the LFPR at 40. In order to ensure that the
results are insensitive to such a noise, we compute a second measure of LFPR by changing
the cohort definition. Specifically, a cohort is now defined as women year of birth ± 2
years. Doing so allows us to substantially increase the cohort size since the average cohort
now contains 5200 observations. Figure 3 displays the alternative measure of cohort LFPR.
As the first instrument, the second one displays a strong upward trend. However and as
expected, the latter is smoother than the former. Row 4 of table 4 reports estimation results
with this “extended” measure of cohort LFPR at 40 as instrument for wife’s activity.
Sub-periods analysis Results of the causal effect presented in table 3 could be seen as an
average over the 2003-2016 period. Implicitly, the model of equations (2) and (3) assumes
that the impact of wife’s labor supply on her husband’s participation does not evolve over
time. To investigate if the magnitude of this causal effect is the same or not throughout
the sample period, we re-estimate two models by considering two sub-periods: i) the 2003-
2006 period and ii) the 2013-2016 period. In the event that there are some changes in the
influence of spousal participation on the participation of their husband, we are likely to
observe a significant difference between the two γH estimated. Results are displayed in rows
5 and 6 of table 4.
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OLS IV
Biprobit
Coef. Marg. eff.
Baseline
0.115 *** 0.280 *** 0.968 *** 0.223 ***
(0.003) (0.032) (0.012) (0.003)
Employment
0.128*** 0.527 *** 1.168 *** 0.293 ***
(0.003) (0.117) (0.060) (0.013)
Prime-age men
0.039 *** 0.036 *** 0.371 *** 0.029 ***
(0.002) (0.043) (0.021) (0.002)
Extended cohort
0.115 *** 0.273 *** 0.806 *** 0.187 ***
(0.003) (0.022) (0.077) (0.017)
2003-2006 period
0.109 *** 0.284 *** 1.305 *** 0.299 ***
(0.007) (0.079) (0.093) (0.020)
2013-2016 period
0.121 *** 0.101 ** 0.426 0.102
(0.005) (0.060) (0.281) (0.066)
Post-2008 period
0.116 *** 0.243 ** 0.794 0.183
(0.004) (0.033) (0.102) (0.023)
Table 4: Robustness estimation - “second stage” estimation.
Sources: French Labour Force Survey (2003-2016), author’s own calculations.
Notes: Only parameters associated to wife’s participation are reported. Standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. Significant levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Except in row 3 and 4, samples contain married
men aged between 50 and 64 years old. Marginal effects are mean marginal effects. Annual fixed effects are
integrated in each regressions but they are not reported in the table.
The post-2008 period As mentioned previously, older men participation rate followed a
downward trend over the 2003-2007 periods before increasing again. Given that the increase
in older men LFPR coincide with the beginning of the Great Recession in France, one could
argue that such a pattern may disturb our general results. To address this issue, we run
regressions by considering the post-2008 period. Results are displayed in the last row of
table 4.
Comments As shown in table 4, the magnitude of the marginal effect of interest is quite
insensitive to our set of robustness check. For each specification, the estimated marginal
effect is highly significant. Overall, this complementary findings reinforce the idea that, on
French data, the willingness to share leisure dominates over any income effects. However
and in some case, the sensitivity analysis provides a refinement of the strength of the causal
impact especially in regards to husband’s age and sub-periods.
Changing the variable indicating labor market attachment confirms our initial intuition.
Thus, the likelihood of being employed for married men increases of about 30 points when
his wife is herself employed (Bivariate Probit estimates). Again, this finding clearly supports
the shared leisure hypothesis. The definition of the cohort has no incidence on the marginal
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Figure 3: Labor force participation rate between 38-42 years old of women born between
1943 and 1976. - France.
Sources: French Labour Force Survey (1983-2016), author’s own calculations.
effect of interest. Indeed, estimated coefficients between this model and the baseline one are
not significantly different. This suggests that the “noise” observed in figure 2 is not a matter
of concern for the problem in hand. Now let me focus on the strength of the effect with
the age of the married men. The third row of table 4 suggests that having a participating
wife increases labor force participation of younger married men of 3 points. Even if the
estimated marginal effects are significant, they are sharply lower compared to what we see
in the baseline case. Such a finding indicates that preferences of prime-age men are different
from those of their older counterparts. Thus, it is possible to conjecture that either the shared
leisure effect is weaker or the income effect is stronger (or a combination of the two effects).
When estimating the model for two different sub-periods, it seems that the magnitude of the
causal effect changes over time. However, the estimates do not provide sufficient statistical
power to strongly affirm this statement. Finally, estimations of the model by considering
only the post-2008 lead to nearly the same results.
6 Concluding remarks
Working with data from the quarterly and the annual French Labour Force Survey, we inves-
tigate the impact of having an active partner on older men labor market behaviors in France
over the 2003-2016 period. To provide a causal interpretation between the two phenomena,
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we estimate both Two-Stage Least Squares and Bivariate Probit using the cohort-specific
participation rate of women at 40 as an exogenous variation in wives’ labor supply. The
construction of the instrument confirms the general increase in female’s participation over
the sample period. Estimates of the wife’s equation indicate that a 1 point increase in cohort
participation at 40 pushes current women likelihood of participation of about 2.5 points.
Then, the marginal effect of interest, estimated with the second stage husband equation, is
shown to be quite strong. More specifically, having an active wife induces an increase in male
participation of 28 points (resp. 22) when Two-Stage Least Squares (resp. Bivariate Probit)
are used. Then, we test for the sensitivity of the results by changing the dependent variable,
the age group of interest and the measure of cohort-specific participation rate. Each time,
our finding is confirmed and the causal effect of having a participating wife on her husband
is estimated to be important.
All in all, this study should be seen as a further step in understanding the relationship
between labor market decisions within couples. In particular, it suggests that, at least, hus-
bands adjust their labor market behaviors to the decisions of their wife. In this respect,
our finding is important from the policy maker viewpoint. Indeed, it suggest that, when
implementing reforms changing the economic environment of elderly, policy designers should
focus on the joint modeling of labor force participation decision in the household, especially
because such modifications have both direct and indirect effects on the second partners.
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